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A PRACTITIONER’S VIEW OF INSTITUTIONAL 
CORRUPTION THROUGH THE LENS OF THE HEALTH 
CARE SYSTEM: AN ESSAY 
Reuben A. Guttman∗ 
These interdisciplinary invaders have come to dominate the faculties 
of the elite law schools and to influence a great many of the other 
law schools. The interdisciplinarians are valuable additions to law 
faculties, but they should not be allowed to displace faculty who 
bring to the teaching of and research into law a rich background of 
legal practice in lieu of expertise in a scholarly field or fields outside 
of law. 
—Richard A. Posner, The Federal 
Judiciary Strengths and Weaknesses, Harvard University Press 2017 
INTRODUCTION 
Think about this: some of the largest drug companies in the world—the 
one’s that we rely on for life saving treatments—are convicted criminals.1 
Hospital chains and large entities that distribute drugs to the elderly have been 
charged with defrauding the government and have paid fines, or entered guilty 
 
 ∗  Reuben A. Guttman is a partner at Guttman, Buschner & Brooks, PLLC and has represented 
whistleblowers in cases against the pharmaceutical industry which have returned more than $5 Billion to the 
Federal and State governments. He is an Adjunct Professor at Emory Law School and a Senior Fellow at the 
Center for Advocacy and Dispute Resolution. He extends thanks to his colleagues Traci Buchner, Justin 
Brooks, Liz Shofner, Caroline Poplin, MD, Dan Guttman, Paul Zwier, Richard Harpootlian, the Honorable 
Nancy Gertner, and Joy Bernstein, who have been a constant sounding board for these issues. 
 1 See GlaxoSmithKline to Plead Guilty and Pay $3 Billion to Resolve Fraud Allegations and Failure to 
Report Safety Data: Largest Health Care Fraud Settlement in U.S. History, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (May 22, 
2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/glaxosmithkline-plead-guilty-and-pay-3-billion-resolve-fraud-allegations-and-
failure-report; Abbott Labs to Pay $1.5 Billion to Resolve Criminal & Civil Investigations of Off-label 
Promotion of Depakote, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Oct. 22, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/abbott-labs-pay-
15-billion-resolve-criminal-civil-investigations-label-promotion-depakote; Ransdell Pierson & Jeremy 
Pelofsky, Pfizer to Pay $2.3 Billion, Agrees to Criminal Plea, REUTERS (Sept. 2, 2009, 11:35PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pfizer-settlement-sb/pfizer-to-pay-2-3-billion-agrees-to-criminal-plea-idUS 
TRE5813XB20090903; E.D. Pa. Crim. Guilty Plea Agreement, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/ 
documents/cephalonplea.pdf; Pfizer Unit Wyeth Pleads Guilty, CORPORATE CRIME REPORTER (July 30, 2013, 
1:35PM), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/wyethpleadsguilty07302013/; Warner Chilcott 
Agrees to Plead Guilty to Felony Health Care Fraud Scheme and Pay $125 Million to Resolve Criminal 
Liability and False Claims Act Allegations, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (April 28, 2017), https://www.justice. 
gov/opa/pr/warner-chilcott-agrees-plead-guilty-felony-health-care-fraud-scheme-and-pay-125-million; 
Johnson & Johnson Unit Pleads Guilty, To Pay More than $2.2 Billion in Global Settlement, CORPORATE 
CRIME REPORTER (Nov. 4, 2013, 11:38AM), https://www.corporatecrimereporter.com/news/200/johnson-
johnson-unit-pleads-guilty-to-pay-more-than-2-2-billion-in-global-settlement/. 
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pleas to resolve allegations of conduct that have placed patients at risk.2 
Healthcare fraud is so rampant that each year the government has recovered 
billions of dollars under the False Claims Act from companies whose 
television advertising attempts to portray a different image; an image of a 
benevolent and caring corporate citizen.  
Yet, with so many employees inside the company, how do these entities do 
what they do for so many years before their wrongful conduct is exposed, 
perhaps by a whistleblower who wakes up one day and questions what others 
have never thought about questioning? The answer to this question involves an 
analysis of how people behave when they are part of an institution—or in this 
case, a large corporation. 
In contemplating this matter, I am reminded of the air raid drills at my 
grade school in the 1960s. Do stay with me because there is a point to be made 
here.  
In second grade, we were marched in double rows, holding hands, to the 
edge of the school property where we were told that when “the big one” 
comes, we should immediately vacate school grounds and walk home. Perhaps 
it is the influence of three decades of practicing law, but I surmise that this air 
raid protocol was cooked up by the lawyers and the insurance companies. Why 
would our school principal—a caring but unwitting fellow—not question why 
a mere exit from school property would protect little tikes from an enemy 
onslaught? The answer is obvious; the protocol was unassailable because it 
came by way of a superior institution, the Board of Education.  
It is not so much that I believe that all people are motivated by self-interest 
or greed; it is that institutions have a way of corrupting even those who are 
inherently principled, or creating a dynamic where unwitting players—even 
principals—are lulled into complicity. To very loosely paraphrase a line used 
by a former Assistant Secretary of Energy in testimony before a House of 
Representatives oversight committee, institutions have a way of causing 
individuals to check their brains at the door.  
 
 2 See Hospital Chain Pleads Guilty in Settlement, QUESTIA (Dec. 15, 2000), https://www.questia.com/ 
newspaper/1P2-5744861/hospital-chain-pleads-guilty-in-settlement; Nate Raymond, CVS’s Omnicare to Pay 
$8 Million to Settle U.S. Probe, UNION LEADER (May 17, 2017, 3:17AM), http://www.unionleader.com/ 
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20170516/NEWS02/170519385/0/NEWHAMPSHIRE14; Major Hospital Pleads 
Guilty to Defrauding U.S.—Nobody Goes to Jail, QUIT ALCOHOL (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.quitalcohol. 
com/news/major-hospital-defrauding-us.html. 
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The problem starts with un-checked institutional allegiance. Too often we 
define ourselves not by our own accomplishments, but by our institutional 
affiliations. We align ourselves with schools, employers, social clubs, and 
sports teams and we too often define our own worth by their accomplishments. 
We even subject ourselves to their branding; we wear school t-shirts, don team 
hats, carry brief cases and travel bags with the logo of our employers and we 
otherwise boast about the accomplishments of our institutional affiliations.  
There is an externality to all of this; when institutional allegiance checks 
in, individual moral or ethical compasses too often check out. For some, there 
is no need to question the conduct of the institution because the beauty of the 
institution is that someone else—perhaps in the ethics department or general 
counsel’s office—takes care of anything that could be of concern. Affiliation 
with an institution is a convenient excuse for abdication of individual 
responsibility.3 And for those who play the odds, this makes complete sense. 
Rarely are individuals held criminally or civilly responsible in direct 
proportion to the wrongdoing that they orchestrate under cover of institutional 
affiliation.4 For those who might gather an inkling of suspicion about 
misconduct within the institution, there is often no incentive to act on the 
suspicion. In simple terms, why make waves when the institution is good to its 
members? If everyone encompassed by the institution thinks things are good, 
then things must be good—especially where the institution has super smart 
people who exist to ensure compliance with law.5 Through years of litigation 
against large corporations, I theorize that this is the thought process for those 
within an institution who are confronted with blowing the whistle on 
wrongdoing.  
 
 3 “Plausible deniability” is a common concept with its own Wikipedia listing. Plausible Deniability, 
WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plausible_deniability (last visited Jan. 24, 2018); See generally 
Ognet, Woody Allen—The Moose, YOUTUBE (Aug. 21, 2007), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yiUS5Z 
f9HRI (Woody Allen indirectly recognizes the plausible deniability phenomenon in his joke about “The 
Moose”). 
 4 See Memorandum from Sally Yates, Dep. Atty. Gen., Department of Justice, to the Department of 
Justice (Sept. 9, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download (instructing US Attorneys, 
and others within the Justice Department, not to conclude investigation of corporate wrongdoing absent an 
investigation and prosecution of individuals who were at the heart of the impropriety. As the memo explained: 
“[o]ne of the most effective ways to combat corporate misconduct is by seeking accountability from the 
individuals who perpetrated the wrongdoing”). 
 5 The words “super smart” are meant to apply to academic pedigree; history has shown that white 
collar criminals can—but not always—be the product of the finest schools; indeed, ones that US News would 
deem top tier. Enron’s Andrew Fastow graduated from Tufts (BA) and Northwestern (MBA) while Enron’s 
Jeffrey Skilling earned his MBA at the Harvard Business School. Insider trader, Raj Rajaratnam, currently in 
prison, graduated from the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania with an MBA. Former White 
House Counsel, John Dean, received his law degree from Georgetown University.  
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Of course, if institutions were truly proficient at compliance with the law, 
there would be no Enron, WorldCom, or Tyco—and certainly Bernie Madoff 
would have been sentenced to a life in government housing long before he 
financed his wrist watch collection with money siphoned from the accounts of 
his clients.6  
A continuing pattern of corporate wronging that has caused major publicly 
traded companies to plead guilty to some form of criminal conduct leads one to 
infer the obvious; corporations balance the penalties for non-compliance 
against the potential economic rewards reaped from skirting the law while 
factoring in the chances of getting caught with some consideration for whether 
there is any colorable defense for the conduct (albeit if only for public relations 
purposes and as a mechanism to leverage a favorable settlement). In theory, 
this formula has generated a long list of convicted criminals, including Pfizer, 
Abbott, Glaxco-Smith-Klein, and Amgen.  
I cannot say the root of my cynicism stems solely from my litigation 
against the healthcare industry. I spent years representing industrial and service 
unions and their members; the average working person—or hardcore union 
member—has no allusions about the power of institutions to corrupt. They 
often view their own employer and their union with the same gimlet eye.  
Yet, my litigation against the healthcare industry has, at the very least, 
been a policy laboratory for the understanding of institutional wrongdoing and 
deficiencies in compliance enforcement. While the lessons I have learned are 
in the first instance about “fraud, waste and abuse,” in the delivery of 
healthcare, they are transferrable and thus have meaning elsewhere.  
I. MOTIVE, MONEY AND PUBLIC REPORTING 
Motive is the reason that anyone does anything—and anything includes 
things that are wrong or just plain illegal. In proving any case, motive can be 
defined by a set of facts that have a tendency to make the ultimate allegation of 
wrongful conduct more or less probable.7  
For publicly traded Pharmaceutical companies, motive starts with Wall 
Street promises. Too often, promises can only be kept through illegal conduct, 
 
 6 The analysis is not limited to corporate institutions. The logic applies to government—as in 
Watergate—and universities—as in Penn State and the child sex scandal. The point is simple; institutional 
affiliation causes people to check their independent thought and analysis at the door. 
 7 E.g. FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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which may include marketing a drug for unapproved purposes, offering money 
or things of value to induce utilization, or generating—under color of 
scholarship—writings that are designed for the purpose of driving 
prescriptions. 
How does this work? Companies make representations to investors about 
their overall revenue streams, the revenue streams attributable to different 
drugs, and the bona fides of certain products. These promises are made, for the 
most part, by business people and not scientists. And sometimes, they are made 
without proper attention to the scientific details of studies, FDA approved 
package inserts, and support from the Centers of Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS), identified “compendia,” which provide some guidance for 
government reimbursement for uses outside the FDA approved label. 8 
For their part, the Wall Street analysts rarely get into the nitty gritty of the 
science; they report on company puffery about trials and studies—always 
noting a share price increase or decline—but seldom drilling down and 
comparing facts and data with an eye toward inconsistencies. Too often, the 
obvious is ignored. 
PharMerica, for example, is a company that provides long term care 
pharmacy services to nursing homes. It is an intermediary between thousands 
of homes, caring for the elderly and the infirm, and the drug industry.9 The 
company’s 2016 Third Quarter 10k indicates that it received rebates from 
Pharmaceutical companies. Rebates are payments based, in general, on the 
volume of drugs distributed to patients.10 The matter of rebates is a sensitive 
issue, opening scrutiny as to whether at least one purpose of such payments—
which is all it takes—is to induce the ordering of drugs where “payment may 
 
 8 CMS Manual System, DEPT. OF HUMAN AND HEALTH SERVICES (Oct. 24, 2008), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Transmittals/downloads/R96BP.pdf (explaining 
compendia).  
 9 See PharMerica, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Mar. 10, 2017) (“Formed in 2006, PharMerica 
Corporation (the “Corporation,” “we,” “us,” or “our”), a Delaware Corporation, is an institutional pharmacy 
services company that services healthcare facilities, provides pharmacy management services to hospitals, 
provides specialty infusion services to patients outside a hospital setting, and offers the only national oncology 
pharmacy in the United States. The Corporation is the second largest institutional pharmacy services company 
in the United States based on revenues and customer licensed beds under contract, operating 98 institutional 
pharmacies and 14 specialty infusion centers and 5 specialty oncology pharmacies in 45 states. The 
Corporation’s customers are typically institutional healthcare providers, such as skilled nursing facilities, 
nursing centers, assisted living facilities, hospitals, individuals receiving in-home care and other long-term 
alternative care providers. The Corporation is generally the primary source of supply of pharmaceuticals to its 
customers. The Corporation also provides pharmacy management services to 89 hospitals in the United 
States”). 
 10 These drugs may be paid for by third party payers.  
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be made in whole or in part under a Federal Health Care program.” This is, in 
part, the language of the Anti-Kickback Statute,11 which criminalizes 
payments, or any granting of an in-kind benefit, which has—as one purpose—
inducing the use of healthcare “items” or “services” which are in whole or part 
paid for with Federal dollars.  
PharMerica, well aware that its conduct implicates scrutiny under the 
Federal Anti-Kickback statute (AKS), notes the following in its 2016 Third 
Quarter 10k: “[w]hile we believe our practices comply with the Anti-Kickback 
statute, we cannot assure our practices that are outside of a safe harbor will not 
be found to violate the Anti-Kickback statute.” And the Third Quarter 10k also 
states: “[w]e believe our contract arrangements with other healthcare providers 
and our pharmaceutical suppliers and our pharmacy practices are in substantial 
compliance with applicable federal and state laws. These laws may, however, 
be interpreted in the future in a manner inconsistent with our interpretation and 
application.” 
A complete reading of PharMerica’s filing with the Securities & Exchange 
Commission (SEC) reveals three important things. First, rebates are material to 
financial success. This is the motivation component; the company needs them 
to thrive. Second, the company says it cannot “ensure” compliance with a 
criminal law. Third, the company has its plausibility position which is that it 
has endeavored to comply with the law. The PharMerica 10k disclosures have 
remained virtually unchanged over the years even though the company has 
paid millions of dollars to resolve alleged violations of the Anti-Kickback 
statute.12  
Ironically, and perhaps as only a parenthetical, PharMerica is a Delaware 
Corporation incorporated to engage in legal activity. Yet, the company’s own 
SEC filings disclose that the company cannot guarantee compliance with 
criminal law, let alone its own corporate charter.13  
 
 11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b. 
 12 See Nation’s Largest Nursing Home Pharmacy to Pay Over $28 million to Settle Kickback 
Allegations, DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 17, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nation-s-largest-nursing-home-
pharmacy-pay-over-28-million-settle-kickback-allegations; Nation’s Second-Largest Nursing Home Pharmacy 
to Pay Over $9.25 million to Settle Kickback Allegations, DEPT. OF JUSTICE (Oct. 7, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nations-second-largest-nursing-home-pharmacy-pay-925-million-settle-
kickback-allegations. 
 13 See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, ‘Blood Chocolate,’ Corporate Law and the ACS, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/blood-chocolate-corporate-law-and-
the-acs (discussing the application of the ultra-vires doctrine to corporate activity that is unlawful. Greenfield’s 
scholarship is the backbone of this application of the law).  
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In theory, one could easily task a team of regulators to cull through SEC 
filings, and other reports, solely for the purpose of analyzing business models 
that place a company on the fringes of compliance with the law. While 
agencies presumptively review filings within their orbit of oversight, they 
seemingly do not review filings outside their orbit of oversight. In other words, 
to an SEC investigator, PharMerica’s representation about its compliance with 
the Anti-Kickback statute may sound like a perfectly reasoned disclosure. Yet, 
to a Health and Human Services investigator from the Office of Inspector 
General (OIG), the representations may be a red flag. Yet, there appears to be 
no process or internal guidance requiring or even counseling investigators—
within a given agency—to routinely look at company filings with other 
agencies. The benefit of doing this is obvious. The attorneys who prepare the 
SEC filings—for example—are seemingly focused on spinning a message that 
is consistent with SEC requirements and may thus provide information that is 
not totally consistent with FDA regulations or guidance.  
Following the money—particularly in financial filings—is always a useful 
path. Revenue stream projections are one test to determine whether a company 
should be investigated. And sometimes projections can be both a motivator for 
and an indicator of impropriety.  
Imagine, for example, a situation where the revenue projections for a 
specific drug greatly exceeded the revenue stream that could possibly be 
predicated from on-label use. Unless there is some obvious reason why 
doctors—on their own—decided to write prescriptions for off label purposes, 
the company is most likely doing something to encourage off label use.14 At 
the very least the differential is an indicator counseling further investigation.   
How might a company drive off label use without it being overtly obvious? 
The answer lies in the use of facially neutral drivers including, for example, 
compensation schemes that bonus sales representatives for both off label and 
on label utilization. The point; if you pay people to chase a goal that requires 
crossing a line of impropriety, there is an increased likelihood that they will 
cross the line. If they do not even know that they are crossing the line, the 
likelihood further increases. 
Facially neutral drivers that cause impropriety are not unique to the 
healthcare arena. Consider, for example, a University, College, or Graduate 
 
 14 The Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA) precludes drugs from being marketed for purposes that are 
not approved. This means that marketing must be within the four corners of the label or “package insert.” 
Doctors, however, are free to use drugs for off label purposes.  
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School that strives to meet the criteria established by US News in order to be a 
nationally ranked institution. The pressure to increase in rankings could result 
in the fudging of qualifications for entering students or the employment 
statistics for graduates.15 This would be a knowing crossing of the line. Or 
there could be a dynamic created where, as part of a recruiting effort, large 
amounts of tuition money are diverted to finance scholarships as a means to 
induce attendance by those with high grades and test scores. To make up the 
deficit, the institution may create less valuable degree programs (not using 
regular tenured faculty) for foreign students who value a US branded degree.16 
To the extent all of this is accomplished under the auspices of creating a global 
institution, the line may be crossed without immediate notice. And with 
individual professors fighting for or benefiting from tenure, how many are 
going to risk their positions to question the propriety of these practices?  
For those engaged in compliance enforcement, the trick is to identify the 
driver and align the schemes that are often quite subtle and always one step 
ahead of compliance enforcement. Getting back to the Pharmaceutical 
industry, companies may challenge sales representatives to compete a product 
with a competitor drug which may have a more expansive indication than the 
product being marketed. Imagine a scenario where company “A” tells its 
representatives to compete their product—which has three indications—with 
company “B’s” product which has seven indications, three of which overlap 
with the company “A” product. The result is that the company “A” product 
will end up being marketed for four indications or applications that have not 
been approved by the FDA.  
Drug companies also employ an array of coaching mechanisms that cause 
representatives to engage in off label marketing without even being made 
aware that they are doing so. The molding of the representatives are done at 
regional and national meetings and by coaching sessions—sometimes called 
“ride alongs”—where a supervisor spends a day with a representative as he or 
she visits doctors. Off label sales technique is also reinforced through regular 
performance evaluations. In addition, “roll plays” are a frequent training 
method employed to mold strategies that can drive off label sales. Roll plays 
often train representatives on the concept of the “probe” which is designed to 
elicit questions that cause the doctor to bring up off label usage. 
 
 15 Morgan Cloud & George Shepherd, Law Deans in Jail, 77 MO. L. REV. 4 (2012), http://scholarship. 
law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol77/iss4/2. 
 16 The parallel is with high end retail outlets or manufacturers who leverage their brand by creating 
lower cost lines or outlets which do not always sell or manufacture products consistent with the known quality 
and reputation of the brand. 
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II. FROM PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY TO SCHEMES  
In the health care arena many schemes are carried out in ways that are open 
and exposed to employees at a number of levels within the corporation. 
Unfortunately, the schemes are subtle and employees are not trained to look for 
impropriety. It may actually seem counter-intuitive that through corporate 
compliance and integrity programs, employees seemingly are led to believe 
that impropriety is actually impossible.17  
Consider this point: Pfizer, GSK, Astra Zeneca, and Amgen have all settled 
large cases where they have been accused of off label marketing or paying 
kickbacks to induce utilization of drugs paid for with federal healthcare 
dollars.18 Each of these companies had internal rules proscribing off label 
marketing and the payment of kickbacks. The same can be said of Enron, 
WorldCom and Tyco. Each of these companies also had internal compliance 
and ethics programs which did not prevent impropriety.  
The lesson to be learned is that where impropriety is orchestrated from the 
top and is actually integral to the business model, no internal compliance 
program will be equipped to halt the wrongdoing.19 To the contrary, the 
existence of such programs will have the effect of assuaging any concern that 
impropriety might exist. Against this backdrop, those who might otherwise 
question impropriety are actually entreated to carry out schemes that have an 
unlawful purpose.  
How does this play out? The Food Drug and Cosmetics Act (FDCA) 
precludes pharmaceutical companies from marketing drugs for purposes 
outside the scope of their FDA approved label. In addition, the Anti-Kickback 
precludes the use of payments, or the giving of things of value, where one 
purpose is to induce the purchase of a product or service which will be paid for 
by a federal health care program. 
 
 17 See Reuben Guttman, Internal Compliance: Is it Really about Compliance?, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: 
EDMOND J. SAFRA CENTER FOR ETHICS (Feb. 24, 2014), https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/internal-compliance. 
My observations along these lines come from three decades representing workers. 
 18 See, e.g., Paul J. Zwier & Reuben Guttman, A Failure of Remedies: The Case of Big Pharma (An 
Essay), 3 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 2 (2016), http://law.emory.edu/ecgar/content/ 
volume-3/issue-2/essays/failure-remedies-case-big-pharma.html, for a more extensive list of prosecutions of, 
and settlements with, the Pharmaceutical Industry.  
 19 See Reuben Guttman, Internal Compliance: Is it Really about Compliance?, HARVARD UNIVERSITY: 
EDMOND J. SAFRA CENTER FOR ETHICS (Feb. 24, 2014), https://ethics.harvard.edu/blog/internal-compliance; 
Reuben Guttman, Do We Really Trust Corporations To Investigate Their Own Profitable Impropriety?, 
FORBES (Aug. 15, 2014, 10:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2014/08/15/do-we-really-trust-
corporations-to-investigate-their-own-profitable-impropriety/#3f112f8a4f9b.  
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Companies including Pfizer, Abbott Labs, GSK, and Amgen violated both 
of these laws for years. The common thread with all of these companies was 
that hundreds of sales representatives were integral to carrying out the schemes 
that implicated liability. With so many people involved, why were the schemes 
not immediately detectable or transparent? 
First, each of these companies trained their sales representatives that off 
label marketing and kickbacks were illegal. Hence, if any sales representative 
was approached by a government investigator and asked conclusory questions 
as to whether off label marketing or kickbacks were occurring, the 
representative would instinctively say something along the following lines: 
“this is unlawful and we would be fired if we did it, and so it could not have 
happened.” Of course, as an aside, this is a lesson in how to question 
witnesses.20  
Undoubtedly, where companies have actually been found liable for paying 
kickbacks or off label marketing their drugs, the training given to employees 
did not key them into the common schemes implicating liability. For example, 
training employees on competitor drugs which carry a different label and 
asking doctors to consider using “our product” if he prescribes “their product” 
is a non - direct way of off label marketing. Similarly, drug companies are 
masters of disguising the payment of kickbacks. The classic example is 
speaker programs where manufacturers pay doctors to give promotional talks. 
When the doctors are selected based on the recommendation of the sales 
representatives with consideration given to a doctor’s prescription writing 
habits, the question arises as to whether the doctor is being selected because of 
medical brilliance or as a means to induce the writing of prescriptions. Those 
who are chosen to give talks are, in the industry, universally known as “key 
opinion leaders” or “thought leaders.” They are not necessarily bestowed these 
titles because of their medical prowess as much as because of their ability to 
influence prescription writing.  
Whatever the avenue, the industry seems one step ahead of the regulators 
in concocting schemes to circumvent regulation and detection. Moreover, 
because the revelation of an unlawful scheme may occur after years of 
investigation, recent compliance actions may only be bringing to terms culprits 
 
 20 Eliciting facts and not conclusions is fundamental to questioning. Once facts are collected, they can 
be assembled and employed in questioning to test theories. Conclusory questions at the front end of a witness 
interview are tantamount to testing a theory before the facts have been established. 
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for conduct that occurred years ago.21 Hence, by the time the scheme is made 
public, there may be newer schemes at play. 
Yet, one common denominator that seems to remain constant from scheme 
to scheme is the need for it to be facially neutral and thus not readily 
detectable. And, in case there are questions about the scheme, there must be a 
plausible rationale for legitimacy. This means that cases must be pieced 
together from bits of circumstantial evidence and that investigators must 
consider the impact of facially neutral rules that may have an unlawful 
purpose.22 
One scheme involves the ghost writing of articles.23 Often a 
pharmaceutical company will organize studies and enlist doctors to administer 
the studies. The doctors may receive compensation for their administration and 
they may be invited to have their names listed as an author of an article 
documenting the results of the study.  
Because these purportedly scientific articles list the names of multiple 
authors, when any one author sees a draft, he or she may presume that earlier 
drafts, edits, or modifications were placed in the text by one of the listed 
authors. In reality, it may be the case that the drug company—which organized 
the project—enlisted ghost writers to edit or draft portions of the manuscript. 
When the manuscripts are submitted for publication, it is virtually impossible 
to track the participation of the ghostwriters. Even where the article is peer 
reviewed, there is no reasonable means for the reviewer to appreciate what, if 
any, role a ghostwriter may have played in publication.  
That ghost writers are involved in the development of purportedly 
scientific materials should actually be of no surprise where doctors distribute 
resumes that take credit for scores of publications. Curiously, where a doctor 
claims credit for seeing patients, teaching, and conducting research, few, if 
 
 21 Specifically, many compliance enforcement actions occur under the False Claims Act (FCA), which 
has a statute of limitations that can be as long as ten years. When FCA actions are initiated by a whistleblower, 
the cases are filed under seal and remain under seal during the pendency of government investigation. These 
investigations can take as long as three to four years.  
 22 See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 23 See, e.g., Matthew Herper, A Former Pharma Ghostwriter Speaks Out, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2011, 
10:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2011/08/10/a-former-pharma-ghostwriter-speaks-
out/#5fac7e4528d6; Natasha Singer, Medical Papers by Ghostwriters Pushed Therapy, THE NEW YORK TIMES 
(Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/05/health/research/05ghost.html?pagewanted=all; Jonathan 
Leo & Jeffrey Lacasse, Ghostwriting and Academic Medicine, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (July 
19, 2010), https://www.chronicle.com/article/GhostwritingAcademic/123613. 
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any, individuals ask the obvious question: “where is there time to write 100 
articles?” 
Publications are no doubt of value to teaching physicians as they try and 
rise within the hierarchy of their academic institution and the medical 
community. That pharmaceutical companies can engineer a scheme where 
doctors can—with minimal if any effort—get the benefit of credit for a 
publication allows pharmaceutical companies to give doctors a thing of value 
without overtly triggering scrutiny under the Anti-Kickback statute.24   
There is no doubt that government prosecutors should be looking at 
doctors—particularly those in a university or medical school setting—who 
claim credit for articles that are in whole or in part ghost written. While the 
starting point for inquiry should be the Anti-Kickback statute, to the extent that 
these articles may form the basis for off label marketing schemes at a 
grassroots level,25 doctors may have exposure for violations of the Federal and 
State False Claims Act and potentially for conspiracy to violate the Food, Drug 
& Cosmetics Act.26 Specifically, the FDCA makes it unlawful to market a 
product for uses outside its FDA approved label. 
How does this work? Purportedly “scientific articles” are placed in the 
hands of sales representatives and distributed to doctors or—in some cases—
even given to financial analysts who may be writing about alternative—or off 
label—uses for existing products. Under these circumstances the so called 
scientific publication becomes the “Trojan Horse” by which the off label 
message is delivered. For their part, companies claim that their free speech 
rights protect scientific communication. Yet, even if this were true—at least as 
to factually accurate communications—this speech would be tainted—and thus 
 
 24 See, 42 U.S.C.S § 1320a-7b. The statute generally prohibits offering, paying, soliciting or receiving 
anything of value to induce or reward referrals or generate Federal health care program business. The United 
States Department of Health and Human Services has outlined the proscriptions; Comparison of the Anti-
Kickback Statute and Stark Law, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/ 
provider-compliance-training/files/StarkandAKSChartHandout508.pdf.  
 25 Pharmaceutical representatives may use ghost written pieces in their efforts to convince individual 
doctors to prescribe a drug for an off-label purpose. Hence, the doctors who generate these pieces are within a 
stream of potentially wrongful conduct. 
 26 Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729, et. seq. (2012) (the statute exposes individuals and 
entities to liability for filing or causing to be filed a false claim for payment or approval where the payment 
involves money which—in whole or in part—has been provided for by the Federal government. At least 20 
states have analogues that provide for the recovery of state or municipal dollars). See also False Claims Act, 
GUTTMAN, BUSCHNER & BROOKS PLLC, http://www.whistleblowerlaws.com/false-claims-act/ (last visited 
Jan. 25, 2018). 
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not protected—where there is a failure to disclose the involvement of the ghost 
writer or the pharmaceutical company.27 
There are two other points to be made on this subject. First, to the extent 
that big pharma attempts to justify the high prices of its drugs because it needs 
the money to finance Research and Development, this contention is dubious. 
To secure an indication for a drug, the Food and Drug Administration analyzes 
raw data. Money spent on studies or trials in support of an FDA approval, or 
post marketing analysis pursuant to the approval, is legitimate R&D. Money 
spent on developing anecdotal data to spin off label messages and for ghost 
writers to draft and place these messages in journals is not legitimate R&D.  
Second, there is a distinction between evidence based medicine—medical 
decision making based on results from the scientific method—and what may 
be called the standard of care. The two are not always the same, but are often 
confused as synonymous. Simply said, the standard of care is what most 
doctors may do, but it does not mean that it is the proper thing to do for a 
patient in all cases.  
Through its messaging and kickbacks, which can be disguised and tendered 
in various forms, the pharmaceutical industry has manipulated the standard of 
care to suit marketing goals. The consequences have broad impact on both 
patient decision making and the application of the rule of law where a patient 
seeks redress for alleged medical malpractice.28 
Patients often have a window of opportunity to review a doctor’s 
recommendation, perhaps seek second opinions, and authorize treatment. 
During this period, patients are often bombarded with analysis along the lines 
of “this is now standard practice,” or “many doctors do this,” or “we have great 
results but we don’t exactly know why it works.” Where the treatment is “off 
label”—or outside the indication listed on a drug’s package insert—even an 
acutely analytical patient will have a hard time distinguishing whether the 
recommendation is based on science or spin.29  
 
 27 See also United States v. Coronia, 703 F.3d 149 (2nd Cir. 2012) (the Court noted some protection of 
off label speech to the extent that it is truthful. Yet, it is—as a practical matter—impossible for a sales 
representative to be truthful when he or she is marketing a product outside its approved indication). See also 
Universal Health Servs. Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S.Ct. 1989 (2016) (the proposition that half- 
truths can be the bases fraud allegations); Caroline Poplin, The First Amendment: Not one Size Fits All, 3 
EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 30 (2016).  
 28 See generally Reuben Guttman & Traci Buschner, Commentary: Give Big Pharma a Dose of Strong 
Regulatory Medicine, MARKET WATCH (Aug. 7, 2013), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/patients-suffer-
from-drug-industrys-chronic-greed-2013-08-07. 
 29 To be clear, sometimes the scientific method may involve treating the symptoms of an illness as the 
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Worse yet, the prescribing physician similarly may be unable to make that 
determination. From his or her vantage point, the recommended usage came 
from someone who was respected in the field whom the industry might term a 
key opinion leader or just “KOL”.30 The doctor may have heard the KOL 
speak at an industry sponsored dinner or maybe the KOL spoke at a university 
hospital at an event sponsored directly or indirectly by a drug manufacturer. 
For his or her part, the KOL may believe in the message. Why question it when 
you are making money from the industry—paid for speaking engagements, 
getting research grants, having the use of editors for publications and having a 
company paid marketer help place papers in colorably legitimate 
publications?31 Industry dollars can influence KOLs and this is why the 
industry keeps spending money to influence them.  
Buying influence over the standard of care is the goal and—
unfortunately—at the end of the day, the patient or prescribing doctor is 
making a decision based on a standard of care that is tainted. And worse yet, 
perhaps unwittingly, the doctor may have placed the patient at unnecessary risk 
for minimal—if any—benefit.32 Consider this; when a doctor writes a 
prescription for an off label use, he or she is doing so without tested and 
approved instructions for the use.  
If the patient is injured through a treatment that is the product of the 
standard of care and not evidence based medicine, legal redress is complicated 
and may come down to a battle between the expert who relies on the industry-
manipulated standard of care, and the expert who is testifying as to evidence 
based medicine. To the extent that the over-arching framework for evaluating 
the reliability of expert opinions is articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, 509 US 579 (1993), a plaintiff may find him or herself 
seeking relief from a practice that has indeed secured wide spread acceptance 
in the medical community but is otherwise quite wrong. Undoubtedly, this 
notion may be lost on first year law students who, in learning the rules of 
 
quickest path to addressing a problem while avoiding batteries of tests. Doctors may, for example, treat 
symptoms of pneumonia with antibiotics without seeking a chest x-ray.  
 30 Of course KOLs are no more than those who are paid by the pharmaceutical industry to promote a 
drug.  
 31 See also Charles Ornstein, Drug-Company Payments Mirror Doctors’ Brand-Name Prescribing, 
NPR (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-
company-payments-mirror-doctors-brand-name-prescribing (payments to doctors does impact their decision 
making); and Alex Spiegel, How to Win Doctors And Influence Prescriptions, NPR (Oct. 21, 2010, 4:11 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=130730104. 
 32 Doctors—but not drug companies—are sworn to the Hippocratic Oath and the notion of “first do no 
harm,” which has been associated with the oath, but does not appear directly in the oath.  
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negligence, read cases about breach of the standard of care and assume—in 
common parlance—that the Defendant deviated from the proper way that 
something should be done. In the world of pharmaceuticals, the drug industry 
has so poisoned the market for honest medical information, that the proper way 
and the standard of care are just not always the same. At the end of the day, 
and after the litigation process exposes the facts, both the prescribing doctor 
and the manufacturer should have liability.  
III. THE FIX  
If a manufacturer markets a snow boot as a product that will last a lifetime, 
there is limited and quantifiable harm if the boot only lasts one winter. The 
boot can be replaced, or the buyer can get his or her money back.  
Health care fraud is different. It is dependent on spinning or manipulating 
purportedly scientific findings in ways that taint the market for honest medical 
information while placing humans at risk in ways that cannot always be 
quantified in monetary terms. Indeed, where there is physical or mental injury, 
dollars cannot make people whole.   
When patients are placed at risk or harm is sustained, the financial burden 
is placed on third party payers—including the Medicare and Medicaid system, 
insurance companies, Taft-Hartley, and public employee health and welfare 
funds—which must subsidize the cost of treatment. To the extent that these 
funds actually seek redress from the pharmaceutical manufactures, they may be 
litigating against entities that serve as investments for Taft Hartley and public 
employee Pension funds.33 This places company owners in the ironic—if not 
conflicts ridden—paradox of seeking redress by litigating against their own 
investments.  
While the government itself, or under the auspices of False Claims Act34 
whistleblower litigation, has recovered billions of dollars from pharmaceutical 
industry wrongdoers, the settlement amounts pale in comparison to the revenue 
secured through wrongful marketing practices.35 The net result is that any 
penalty paid through settlement has been perhaps the fee for a license to break 
 
 33 Who invests in pharmaceutical companies? The answer is pension funds. 
 34 False Claims Act, supra note 23. See generally EmorySchoolofLaw, A Conversation on 
Whistleblowers and the False Claims Act, YOUTUBE (May 11, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v 
=yiUS5Zf9HRI. 
 35 See also Paul J. Zweir & Reuben Guttman, A Failure of Remedies, 3 EMORY CORP. GOVERNANCE & 
ACCOUNTABILITY REV. 42 (2016). 
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the law.36 This is not to say that the industry is not aware of the potential for 
compliance enforcement; it is to say that current litigation brought on behalf of 
the government has not had a perfect, or even close to perfect, deterrence 
effect.  
And, to the extent that compliance enforcement has focused on monetary 
damages, current compliance enforcement efforts have not accounted for 
injury to the market for honest scientific information. While corporate 
compliance agreements may require or proscribe conduct, the agreements—
many of which are boilerplate—do not require programs to educate the market 
on the proper use of a particular drug. Absent a corrective educational effort, a 
company pays a sum to settle while getting the benefit of a non-evidence based 
standard of care which remains in place uncorrected even after settlement.  
One possible solution is to use False Claims Act settlement monies to 
finance education campaigns that re-adjust or correct the market for honest 
medical information.37 There are several ways to accomplish this goal. First, 
State Attorney Generals and the Department of Justice, with the help of 
respective agencies, can issue a settlement white paper fully documenting the 
findings of any investigation underlying a settlement. Of course, if a case is 
litigated, prosecutors should press to ensure that briefs and trial transcripts are 
matters of public record. Either of these steps can be accomplished by federal 
prosecutors or State Attorneys General.  
Second, to the extent that pharmaceutical marketing derelictions are 
analogous to a train wreck, Congress should establish a National 
Transportation Safety Board analogue to investigate and issue reports on the 
marketing impropriety and the proper use for the drug or the product.38 The 
overarching purpose for this is to correct the market for honest medical 
information and to document the schemes. Fully documenting and publicizing 
the schemes makes it difficult for companies to engage in the wrongful 
conduct absent detection. 
 
 36 See also Reuben Guttman & Jennifer Williams, Controlling Government Contractors: Can the False 
Claims Act be More Effective?, 14 SEDONA CONF. J. 1 (Sept. 2013). 
 37 While one possible solution is to run these programs through universities, this is not a solution 
because the drug industry—through payments to doctors and teaching institutions—has in part corrupted these 
entities as well.  
 38 See also Reuben Guttman & Traci Buschner, Taking the Next Step in Pharma Fraud, ACS BLOG 
(May 8, 2012), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/taking-the-next-step-in-pharma-fraud; and Reuben Guttman, 
Just Another Pharma Settlement?, ACS BLOG (Aug. 1, 2013), https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/just-another-
pharma-settlement; and Guttman, Commentary, supra note 28. 
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Third, settlement monies should in some larger measure be spent to 
reinforce compliance efforts. Monies recovered in False Claims Act cases are 
mostly channeled back to the treasury. A material portion of the recovery 
should be earmarked to bolster compliance enforcement through added 
investigators and attorneys.  
Most importantly, individuals need to be held accountable for the 
economic damage and injury to humans done though marketing practices that 
have over- ridden medical diligence. Though institutions have a way of 
corrupting and coopting humans, it is humans—in the end—who must be held 
accountable through both civil and criminal prosecution.  
CONCLUSION 
For reasons perhaps inherent in the human condition, institutions have a 
way of corrupting the conduct of individuals. The consequences of corruption 
are significant where the institution is charged with lifesaving functions. 
Regulators, consumers, and employees can no longer rely on bona fides of 
these institutions, and a degree of hyper diligence is necessary—especially 
where the schemes are both complex and subtle. 
 
